Political Stray Alert
The US military over the fourth of July (2008) weekend transferred 550 metric tons of yellowcake uranium from Iraq to an allied country for use in their nuclear power plants. The sale was arranged at Iraq's request, after troops discovered it after the 2003 invasion.
If we are to believe global media, that would be 550 metric tons of nonexistant yellow cake uranium, part of the weapons of mass destruction that Sadaam didn't have.
The Political Stray
For an interesting discussion about Iraq's yellow cake:
http://www.americanthinker.com/2008/07/the_550_tons_of_yellowcake.html
From the Horse's Mouth:
Saddam's Secrets
By Georges Sadas - Former Iraqi Air force General
(an excellent read)
Saddam's Bombmaker
By Khidhir Hamza
The Bomb in My Garden
by Mahdi Obeidi
Islam and Terrorism
by Mark A. Gabriel (former Imam from Egypt)
CIA Timeline of Events - Iraq and WMD's
CIA
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Democrats are Americans. Republicans are Americans. Leftists are Americans. Rightists are Americans.
Americans are united no matter how much we bicker. Let no enemy that reads this page make a mistake about that.
United. First, Last and Always.
The Political Stray
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The First Entry is an excerpt from a book, prefaced by a fleeting thought from PS.
Saddam's Secrets
By Georges Sadas - Former Iraqi Air force General
A fascinating read that confirms that truth can be more hair raising than fiction. The General is articulate and a natural born storyteller. It will be books like this that will save the middle east from itself. If mankind is capable of living together in peace and prosperity, it will be men like the General that will show us the way.
You may not always agree with the General, but progress isn't made by striving for complete agreement. Peace is achieved with reasonable solutions found by reasonable people tired of unnecessary death.
You'll come away realizing that it's not tyranny we must fear, but the apathy that allows it's birth.
The Political Stray
Excerpt One
In November 1990 I made a frightening discovery: Saddam had ordered the air force to begin planning for a major aerial assault against Israel. If the Americans were going to attack and force him to give up Kuwait, he said, then our pilots would be ready to attack Israel as soon as the first rockets hit, and they would extract a heavy price. They would attack in two massive, back-to-back assaults with three types of chemical weapons: the nerve gas Tabun, as well as Sarin 1 and Sarin 2.
The mission was to deploy ninety-eight of our best fighter aircraft---Russian Sukhois, French Mirages, and the MiGs---fueled and equipped to penetrate the Israeli borders through Jordan and Syria, but without telling either of those countries that we were coming. Clearly this would be an unauthorized invasion of Syrian and Jordanian air space, with payloads of deadly toxins. I was shocked that such an order could have been given; but I knew that if this mission ever took place, crossing restricted air space would be the least of our worries.
A few days after I first learned about the plans, I got a call from the palace. They told me that Saddam was asking for me personally, and he wanted to see me in his office right away. So, again, I went to meet with the president, and I was surprised to see that the entire general staff was already assembled in the conference room when I arrived.
Saddam had checked me out many times, and I think he respected me. I know why he trusted me: he couldn't trust most of his generals to tell him the truth because of their fear of him and their allegiance to a religious or political agenda. Either they would say whatever Saddam wanted to hear, or they would say what was politically advantageous to their own people. So he would often say to me, "At least Georges will tell me the truth." And even Saddam occasionally needed to hear the truth.
I didn't know why he had called me that day, but I knew it was going to be something very important. Several of the officers in the room were of higher rank than I was, but it was prearranged for me to sit right in front of Saddam. By right, my place should have been on the second row, but he had instructed his aides to put me on the first row so that's where I sat.
When everyone was seated, Saddam made a few remarks and then he looked at me and said, "Georges, do you know why you're here?" I said, "No, sir, but it's a great pleasure to be here." He said, "I've decided that the air force will attack Israel." Suddenly I knew what this was all about. Although I had no idea where the conversation would end up, it was clear that Saddam was looking for justification for a decision he had already made.
So I asked, "Attack Israel, sir?" and he said, "Yes, that's right." He gave me a moment to reflect on that, and then he began asking me all sorts of questions.
The first question he asked was surprising. He said, "Georges, who's stronger, Israel or Iraq?" I knew what he wanted me to say, but I had to be realistic. After all, the reason Saddam had called for me was because he knew I would answer him honestly and correctly. So I paused for a moment and said, "Sir, what you're talking about is the difference between men who are blind and men who can see."
He looked at me quizzically and said, "What do you mean, Georges?" I said, "Sir, there are two groups, one which is blind and one which can see, and they're preparing for battle."
"Yes," he said, "and which is which? Which ones are blind and which ones can see?" "Unfortunately, sir," I told him, "we're the blind ones and the Israelis are the ones who can see." With that, Saddam erupted. "Why!?"
Believe me, I knew I was on shaky ground. Many good men had died for words less offensive than the ones I'd just spoken. Saddam had personally shot and killed high-ranking officers on the spot , and he had ordered men to be executed for thoughts or actions he only imagined. So before I answered the question, I decided to make one more defensive maneuver, and I said, "Sir, if I speak the truth to you now, will you, according to the custom of the Arabs, give me permission to speak freely, with immunity?" In other worlds, I was saying, Will you promise not to shoot the messenger?
Saddam's eyes were threatening, but he knew what I meant. What I was asking for was a centuries-old tradition among the desert Arabs, an oath sworn by tribal leaders to allow a messenger to speak freely without fear of being killed. As he folded his arms across his chest, Saddam said, "Yes, I give you immunity." Then, more forcefully, he said, "Now tell me what you mean!"
I had no choice but to answer him. I knew full well that he had given immunity to others in the same circumstances and they were hanged, but I was honor-bound to tell the truth. So I breathed a silent prayer, Lord, give me the courage to speak, and I spoke.
Excerpt Two
Saddam's Secrets by Georges Sada, Former Air Force General for Saddam
Chapter: Insurgency and Survival
The Chinese Connection
More recently, I learned from a close family member of a high-ranking Iraqi official that Saddam made arrangements in August 1990 to aquire nuclear weapons directly from a group of nuclear scientists in China. After the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam realized that scrutiny of his weapons progams was going to be much too intense for Iraq to continue nuclear development, and it would have been next to impossible to maintain secrecy. So he made a deal to pay the Chinese scientists $100 million to manufacture weapons for him.
However, when the chief accountant of the Ministry of Military Industrialization tried to transfer the first payment of $5 million from an account at the Rafidan Bank, Al Riyadh Branch, on August 4, 1990, he discovered that the transaction was being blocked on orders from America----this was apparently being done in anticipation of the beginning of the first Gulf War. After several failed attempts to transfer the funds by wire, it was decided that a courier would come to collect the money.
According to a report that I have seen, the courier arrived in Baghdad on October 15, 1990. He took the $5 million in cash and returned to China the same way he had come. I don't know what happened to the money or the relationship after the Gulf war, but I certainly believe that Saddam would have continued to pursue those arrangements throughout the 1990s, using a portion of the more than $11 billion he received through the Oil-for-Food program. To insure the secrecy of those plans, however, Saddam simply eliminated anyone with detailed knowledge of them, including the accountant who had managed the transfer. That man died of cancer 1994, but suspecting that his disease was no accident, he revealed the details of those transactions to a family member fefore his death, and tha t individual subsequently related his story to me.
Underlying all of Saddam' secret operations was a foundation of fraud and corruption. According to the report of the Independent Inquiry Committee of the United Nations, headed by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, released in October 2005, more than 2,200 companies participating in the United Nations' Oil-for-Food program paid at least $1.8 billion in kickbacks to Saddam. More than sixty-six countries were involved, and manipulation of oil profits in violation of the sanctions agreements helped to increase Saddam's personal wealth by as much as $11 billion.
In another highly acclaimed book called "The Bomb in My Garden", published in 2004, Dr. Mahdi Obeidi describes his work on the centrifuge programs in Iraq. Obeidi served as director of the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrilization, which was the weapons development arm of the Iraqi government. At one point he had in his own possession all the records of the nuclear enrichment programs in Iraq as well as extensive documentation on the entire history of Saddam's WMDs programs---hidden in an oil drum buried in his back yard.
Many of those documents were eventually turned over to the U.S. State Department and were reportedly the largest collection of evidence of Iraqi WMDs in the West. So there's no lack of evidence that all of this had been going on in Iraq for more than three decades. But the question of how Saddam hid these weapons and equipment prior to and during the second Gulf War involves another brilliant bit of deception.
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Excerpt from "American Soldier"
By General Tommy Franks – The Commander in Chief of the United States Central Command from July 2000 through July 2003
General Franks led the American and Coalition Forces into Iraq in the second Gulf war, "Operation Iraqi Freedom".
A note from the Political Stray:
This is a must read book for those of us that demand first hand information when it comes to important subjects.
A good complement to the Iraqi General Sadas account of Operation Iraqi Freedom. General Franks will take you to the same event, but from the American side.
He will take you to the very first day of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Who was there. What they said. How he felt. Once again we are reminded of how different soldiers are from the way they are so often portrayed. His account is intelligent and often funny at his own expense. He will quickly rid you of any old fashioned stereotypes of single-minded patriotism and small town boys.
You'll go on a longer trip with General Franks, You'll spend time in small town America and feel the sticky jungle heat in Viet Nam. He brings you with him from the visits with royalty in Saudi Arabia to the meetings in which the most powerful people in America prepare to give the order to take out one of the worst mass murderers of our time, Saddam Hussein.
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American Soldier
PROLOGUE
D-DAY
1634 Hours, 19 March 2003
Prince Sultan Air base, Saudi Arabia
I leaned forward in the leather chair, watching the blank video projection screen. After a flicker of static, the wood-paneled White House Situation Room snapped into focus.
President George W. Bush sat between Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Colin Powell at the head of the mahogany table. The five other members of the National Security Council sat along the sides, facing the screen on which our image appeared, just as theirs was displayed here.
The men's dark suits were well cut. Dr. Condoleeza Rice wore a tailored jacket. They could have been a corporate board, but the subject of this teleconference was not profit or loss. The topic was war.
If the President gave me the order, thousands of Coalition soldiers and Marines would attack across the Iraqi border in a matter of hours. Hundreds of American, British, and Australian warplanes would support the ground force.
"Can you hear me, Mr. President?" I asked.
"Yes we can, Tommy. We can hear you fine. You've got the National Security Council here."
"Sir," I began. "I would like to give a brief introduction of our component commanders and let them give you a quick status report. We'll go around the horn. I'll start with Lt. General Buzz Moseley."
I nodded to my left. Buzz wore a desert-tan U.S. Air Force flight suit with the three stars of his rank on the shoulders. Beside him at our oval table as Royal Air Force Air Vice Marshal Glenn Torpy, who commanded the Coalition's British aviators. Group Captain Geoff Brown, the commanded of the Australian Air Component, sat to my right.
"Our command and control is full up, Mr. President," Buzz reported. "Our Coalition forces are in place. The Air Component is airborne, overhead Iraq right now. Mr. President, we have the best-trained, best-equipped, best-motivated people in the world, and we're well prepared to execute this task."
The people in Washington looked grave. Colin was plainly tired. Maybe even as tired as I was. My immediate boss, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, was calm, thoughtful. Beside him, Air Force General Dick Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appeared somber. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenent sat across the table, listening closely. They recognized the gravity of the moment.
The ultimate objective of our forces was Baghdad. Their mission was to overwhelm the enemy and topple one of the most dangerous and repressive dictatorships in the world, the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein.
Then, as I looked at the screen, I could see President Bush speaking ---but now I couldn't hear his words. Apparently, the sound on the secure satellite video link had just failed. Hope this isn't an omen. The President spoke again, but the picture was mute. Don Rumsfeld waved, pointing a finger toward his ear and mouthing something. Then Buzz leaned over and tapped a switch on my black console.
I had inadvertently cut the audio. "Mr. Secretary, I found this thing on my machine here," I said with exaggerated contrition. "I can read you loud and clear now."
My gaffe had broken the tension. The White House Situation Room echoed with laughter.
"Don't worry, Tommy," the President said, grinning. "We haven't lost confidence. Fortunately we're dealing with pilots sitting next to you."
His tone changed. The President's words were precise. "General," he asked Buzz Moseley, "do you have everything you need to win?"
"You bet, Sir."
"Pleased with the strategy?" the President continued.
"Absolutely, Buzz answered.
Our strategy to defeat Saddam's military and free Iraq was contained in a complex and ambitious operations plan that my staff and I had hammered out over months with Don Rumsfeld, an OPLAN unique in military history. During Operation Desert Storm, which drove the Iraqis from Kuwait, the coalition had deployed 560,000 troops in fourteen divisions. The four-day ground war did not begin until an intense five-week air campaign had pounded the enemy. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, I would command fewer than half the number of troops---in only five divisions, equipped with less than half the armor and artillery—than the force that had defeated the Iraqi army in 1991. But we would not stop at the Euphrates river. We planned to go all the way to Baghdad and beyond. And under our strategy, decisive air operations would begin after our ground units went into combat.
This was a calculated risk. But in thirty-eight years as a soldier, I'd learned the difference between a risk and a gamble.
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Saddam's Secrets by Georges Sadas
Former Air Force General for Saddam
From the Chapter: The War of Liberation
Excerpt 3
Shock and Awe
The war began on March 19, 2003, with an attack that was described by military analysts and the international news media as "shock and awe." On March 18, just hours before the orchestrated assault was supposed to begin, President Bush received word from intelligence sources in Iraq saying that Saddam was in a bunker in the middle of Baghdad. So without taking time to alert his commander in the field, Gen. Tommy Franks, about what he'd learned, the U.S. commander-in-chief gave the order to strike, hard and fast, to try to end the war before it began.
Immediately, dozens of cruise missiles were launched from the aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf. Cable viewers around the world watched the unfolding drama in real time as those weapons rained down on the city. The fireworks that descended on the capital that night were unbelievable. I was glued to the television for hours, and I watched those scenes with a combination of sadness, fear, and hope. And I couldn't help but recall my own night of horror when I was nearly a victim of the first night's bombing twelve years earlier in January 1991.
I'm sure Saddam must have been shocked by the fury of that night and the incredible precision of the weapons that fell on the city. But he wasn't in the bunker when the first missiles struck. Television cameras showed the devastation from the explosions, but coalition operatives on the ground in Baghdad reported that Saddam had been somewhere else and was still on the loose. The next day, Gen. Tommy Franks gave the order to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the second war in the Gulf was rapidly under way.
From that moment, the war was a rapid succession of air and missile assaults followed by a rapid mechanized infantry and armor advance to the capital by American Army and Marine units. The tactics of coalition forces surprised everyone. They didn't stop to engage the Iraqi resistance on the way but raced straight up the main highway toward Baghdad. Within days they were able to secure Saddam International Airport and post guards at all the major bridges along the way.
Some of the British and American units that followed the main assault took up positions in major cities and outposts, and they began clearing out the pockets of resistance in the southern cities of Basra, An Nasiriyah, Al Kut, and others. But the rapid dash to Baghdad by the U.S. Marines completely outsmarted Saddam's forces, and just twenty-two days later, when the forty-foot-tall statue of Saddam was pulled down in Fardus Square, on April 9, 2003, it was apparent that the war was over and, finally Saddam was no longer in charge.
Bringing down that statue, and the scene of young boys pounding on it with their shoes, was a scene the world would never forget. Seeing the image of their dictator torn down, broken, destroyed, and disgraced in that way sent a clear message to the people of Iraq that things were going to be very different for them in the future.
It struck me that this was the first time in forty-five years that I hadn't participated in military operations as an Iraqi officer, and it was an odd sensation. But I was glad not to be there, and my friends in Conventry were even more so. Several of them called me and said, "Georges, don't event think about going back to Iraq for a while. It won't be safe for you there, and you're too important to the future of your country to risk your life now. We'll let you know when we feel it's a good time to go back." So I said okay, and I remained in London for three more weeks, until it was safe enough to return to Baghdad.
Saddam's Secrets by Georges Sadas
Former Air Force General for Saddam
From the Chapter: Insurgency and Survival
Excerpt Four
A Natural Disaster
Saddam had ordered our weapons teams to hide the WMDs in places no military commander or United Nations weapons inspector would expect to find them. So they hid them in schools, private homes, banks, business offices, and even on trucks that were kept constantly moving back and forth form one end of the country to the other. And then fate stepped in.
On June 4,2002, a three-mile-long irrigation dam, which had been drawing water from the Orontes river in the northwestern district of Zeyzoun, Syria, collapsed, inundating three small villages and destroying scores of homes. Many people and livestock were killed, and the flood waters covered an area of nearly forty square miles. As soon as word of the disaster was broadcast on television, help began arriving from allover the Middle East. The Red Crescent, which is the equivalent of the Red Cross in our area, brought in aid workers to set up shelters and render medical care.
But when Syrian president Bashar al-Assad asked for help from Jordan and Iraq, Saddam knew what he would do. For him, the disaster in Syria was a gift, and there, posing as shipments of supplies and equipment sent from Iraq to aid the relief effort, were Iraq's WMDs. Weapons and equipment were transferred both by land and by air. The only aircraft available at the time were one Boeing 747 jumbo jet and a group of Boeing 727s. but this turned out to be the perfect solution to Saddam's problem. Who would suspect commercial airliners of carrying deadly toxins and contraband technology out of the country? So the planes were quickly reconfigured.
All the passenger seats, galleys and toilets, storage compartments, and other related equipment that would be needed for civilian passengers were removed, and new flooring was installed, thus transforming the passenger planes into cargo planes. The airliners were then used for transporting hundreds of tons of chemicals, armaments, and other paraphernalia into Syria under the cover of a mission of mercy to help a stricken nation.
Eventually there were fifty-six sorties. Commercial 747s and 727s moved these things out of the country. This was another of Saddam's tricks. Instead of using military vehicles or aircraft which would have been apprehended and searched by coalition forces, Saddam's agents had used the civilian airlines. He arranged for most of these shipments to be taken to Syria and handed over to ordnance specialists there who promised to hold everything for as long as necessary. Subsequently, I spoke at length to a former civilian airline captain who had detailed information about those flights. At the time he held an important position at Iraqi Airways, which is the commercial airline in Baghdad.
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Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline EventsRegime Strategy and WMD Timeline Events | Serial # | Issue Area | Date Name | Short Description | 1 | POL | 1980 | Iraq invades Iran | 2 | POL | 1981 | Israeli Air Force bombs Iraqâ~®s Osirak nuclear reactor | 3 | CW | 08-Jun-81 | Code name Research Center 922 to produce chemical weapons (CW) agents Mustard, Tabun, Sarin, and VX | 4 | NUC | 1981 | Iraq Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) pursues Laser Isotope Separation (LIS) for uranium enrichment | 5 | CW | 06-Aug-81 | CW program reorganized (Project 922) at Al Rashad | 6 | NUC | Early 1982 | IAEC Office of Studies and Development (OSD) established for uranium enrichment R&D (later renamed Office 3000) | 7 | BW | 1983 | BW program added to Project 922 mission | 8 | CW | 1983 | First media reports of use of Iraqi CW (Mustard) against Iranian forces | 9 | CW | 1984 | Media reports of the use of CW (Tabun) against Iranian forces | 10 | NUC | 1984 | Al Qaim yellowcake plant commissioned | 11 | BW | 1985 | BW program restarted | 12 | POL | Mid 1985 | Iranian F4 attack on Project 922 site (later Al Muthanna State Establishment - â~~Al Muthannaâ~®) | 13 | CW | 1986 | Construction of Fallujah II commenced | 14 | POL | Oct-86 | Iranian SCUDs fired at MSE | 15 | POL | Nov-86 | Irangate scandal in the United States (the covert supplying of missiles to Iran) | 16 | POL | Late 1986 | Iraq deploys significant portion of Roland Air Defense Systems to Al Muthanna | 17 | BW | 1987 | Proposal to scale up BW production at MSE denied; program moved to Al Salman | 18 | NUC | April 1987 | Groups 1, 2, 3 formed under Office 3000; Group 1 leaves, becomes Engineering Design Directorate under MIC | 19 | NUC | April 1987 | Al Husayn project formed to study requirements for weapons program | 20 | BW | Aug-87 | Taji Single Cell Protein (SCP) assets relocated to bolster BW at Al Salman | 21 | POL | 19-Aug-87 | Lieutentant General Husayn Kamil (HK) appointed head of new Military Industrialization Commission (MIC) | 22 | NUC | November 1987 | Al Husayn project transfers to IAEC and later becomes Group 4 under Office 3000 | 23 | NUC | Late 1987 | Iraq begins construction on Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS) facilities at Tarmiya | 24 | BW | 1988 | Initial BW trials (Feb-May) | 25 | POL | Feb-1988 | War of the Cities begins | 26 | DS | February 1988 | Iraq receives last of 29 deliveries of 819 SCUDs from former Soviet Union (FSU) | 27 | POL | Mar-88 | CW used against Kurdish city of Halabja | 28 | NUC | 1988 | LIS abandoned as a uranium enrichment process | 29 | POL | Apr-1988 | War of the Cities ends | 30 | BW | Apr-1988 | Construction of dedicated BW agent production plant (Al Hakam) begins | 31 | BW | May 1988 | BW broadened with addition of fungal toxins | 32 | NUC | mid 1988 | Iraq begins magnetic-bearing centrifuge program | 33 | NUC | August 1988 | Construction begins on Al Athir nuclear weapons fabrication & assembly facility under Al Husayn project (Group 4) | 34 | NUC | August 1988 | German engineers provide centrifuge design data | 35 | CW | August 1988 | Al Muthanna stops CW agent production and focuses on research | 36 | POL | 08-Aug-88 | Iran and Iraq agree to ceasefire | 37 | NUC | November 1988 | Husayn Kamil takes control of combined Iraqi nuclear weapons program | 38 | BW | November 1988 | Al Kindi vaccine production fermentation line moved to Al Hakam | 39 | BW | 1989 | First bulk production run of Botulinum toxin at Al Hakam | 40 | NUC | Jan 1989 | Office 3000 officially renamed Petrochemical Project 3 (PC-3) under Jaâ~®far | 41 | DS | 1989 | Iraq cancels BADR-2000 Contract with Egypt | 42 | NUC | Feb-90 | Iraq completes one nuclear-related fireset | 43 | POL | 02-Apr-90 | Saddam threatens to use binary CW against Israel if Israel attacks Iraq | 44 | CW | Apr-1990 | Manufacture of Al Husayn special chemical warheads commences | 45 | POL | April 1990 | Husayn Kamil gives orders to weaponize BW as quickly as possible | 46 | CW | Jun-1990 | Iraq starts filling Al Husayn special warheads (CW) & R-400 bombs at Al Muthanna | 47 | NUC | 1990 | EDC acquires carbon fiber rotors from a German supplier | 48 | NUC | 1990 | Iraq arranges for a winding machine and carbon fiber (reaches Jordan July 1992) | 49 | PROC | 17-Jul-90 | Saddam accuses neighbors of threatening Iraq via low oil prices | 50 | PROC | 18-Jul-90 | Tariq â~~Aziz accuses Kuwait of stealing Iraqi oil | 51 | CW | August 1990 | Iraq deploys a range of CW around Iraq before invasion of Kuwait | 52 | POL | 02-Aug-90 | Iraq invades Kuwait | 53 | POL | 06-Aug-90 | United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 661 establishes embargo on Iraq | 54 | BW | Sep-90 | Al Dawrah Foot & Mouth Disease Vaccine (FMDV) plant annexed by BW for agent production and virus R&D | 55 | BW | Sep-90 | Agricultural Water and Resources Center annexed by BW for aflatoxin production | 56 | BW | Nov-1990 | Iraqâ~®s declared start date for Mirage F-1 drop tank CW spray conversion (for BW) | 57 | DS | November 1990 | MIG-21 Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) Conversion project initiated | 58 | BW | Dec-1990 | 1st flight test of Mirage F-1 CW spray drop tank system (for BW) | 59 | NUC | Jan-91 | Work on uranium metal casting initiated at Al Athir | 60 | BW | Jan-1991 | R-400, 400A BW bombs sent to Airstrip 37 and Al â~~Aziziyah firing range | 61 | NUC | Early 1991 | Tarmiya EMIS equipment commissioned; Iraq testing a gas centrifuge using carbon fiber rotor | 62 | NUC | Early 1991 | After Kuwait invasion, Iraq resumes work on a 50-machine centrifuge cascade, as part of a â~ecrashâ~~ nuclear program | 63 | DS | 12-Jan-91 | MIG-21 RPV flight from Al Rashid Air Base | 64 | CBW | 15-Jan-91 | MIC orders evacuation to safety of all assets & dangerous materials | 65 | BW | 15-Jan-91 | Mirage F1 droptank deployed to Al â~~Ubaydi with anthrax spores at airfield out-station | 66 | BW | 15-Jan-91 | Iraq deploys 25 BW warheads | 67 | POL | 17-Jan-91 | Gulf War (Desert Storm) begins | 68 | POL | Feb 1991 | Sources warn that Iraq will use WMD if territorial integrity threatened | 69 | POL | 28-Feb-91 | Gulf War ends | 70 | POL | March 1991 | All but two Iraqi provinces in revolt | 71 | POL | March 1991 | Iraq uses CS and nerve agent-filled bombs on Shiâ~®a in Najaf and Karbala (nerve bombs fail to operate) | 72 | DS | April 1991 | MIG-21 RPV Program discontinued post Desert Storm | 73 | NUC | Early 1991 | Qusay, Husayn Kamil order nuclear documents and equipment hidden | 74 | BW | 01-Apr-91 | Single-Cell Protein (SCP) and Bio-pesticide (BT) decided as cover for Hakam | 75 | POL | 03-Apr-91 | UNSCR 687 demands disarmament and compensation fund financed by Iraq | 76 | NUC | April 1991 | Centrifuge development ceases after UNSCR 687 | 77 | POL | Mid April 1991 | Regime begins denial and deception program | 78 | POL | April 1991 | Husayn Kamil orders retention of 85 SCUD missiles | 79 | POL | April 1991 | Husayn Kamil orders elimination of evidence of offensive BW program, but BW weapons remain in situ at deployment sites | 80 | POL | 18-Apr-91 | Iraq responds to UNSCR 687 with incomplete WMD declaration | 81 | BW | 18-Apr-91 | Iraq letter to UN Secretary General (UNSG) denies BW program | 82 | NUC | 27-Apr-91 | Iraq declares safeguarded material and Al Qaim yellowcake production to UN/IAEA | 83 | NUC | Late May 1991 | PC-3 sites ordered to hand over materials, equipment and documents to the Security Apparatus for the Protection of Military Industrialization Establishments (SAP) prior to inspections to avoid detection | 84 | POL | June 1991 | Husayn Kamil orders retention of WMD know-how documentation and small amounts of key WMD materiel | 85 | CW | 09-Jun-91 | UNSCOM starts weapons inspections; first CW inspection at MSE (U-2, CW-1) | 86 | POL | 30-Jun-91 | Iraqi High Level Committee formed to address retention of proscribed materiel | 87 | POL | 1991 | Saddam states: â~eSanctions will last no more than 3 yearsâ~~ | 88 | DS | July 1991 | Husayn Kamil orders retention of 2 missiles and some missile parts | 89 | POL | July 1991 | Special Republican Guard (SRG) officers receive orders from Qusay to move/conceal MIC materials | 90 | DS | 06-Jul-91 | Iraq completes destruction of declared SCUD-type missiles under UNSCOM supervision | 91 | NUC | 07-Jul-91 | IAEA seizure of EMIS components prompts Iraqi admission of large EMIS program | 92 | POL | 1991 | Husayn Kamil tells â~~Abd Hamid Mahmoud it is unnecessary to declare BW programs and will order scientists to hide evidence at home | 93 | DS | July 1991 | Unilateral missile destruction | 94 | POL | July 1991 | Unexpectedly robust UN inspections lead Iraq to start unilateral destruction, as later claimed by regime | 95 | NUC | by 1991 | Iraq receives nine flow-forming machines from Germany | 96 | CBW | Mid July 1991 | CW and all BW munitions unilaterally destroyed, according to subsequent Iraqi claims | 97 | POL | Summer 1991 | Committee of Special Duties forms under Husayn Kamil or Qusay to covertly obstruct UN inspections | 98 | BW | 02-Aug-91 | First UNSCOM BW inspection begins at Al Salman (U-7, BW-1) | 99 | POL | 15-Aug-91 | UNSCR 707 demands Full, Final and Complete Declaration (FFCD) as required by UNSCR 687 | 100 | PROC | Sept 1991 | Iraq-Jordan Trade Protocol renegotiated and then reviewed annually | 101 | POL | Sept 1991 | UNSCOM begins destruction of declared CW and agent; continues until July 1994 | 102 | NUC | Late 1991 | IAEA seizure of documents leads to Iraqi admission of Al Athir existence | 103 | BW | Sept or Oct 1991 | Destruction of bulk agents at Al Hakam (reported to UN in 1995) | 104 | PROC | 01-Sep-91 | MIC forms Al Bashaâ~®ir front company to obtain items for Ministry of Defense (MoD), IAEC | 105 | POL | 11-Oct-91 | UNSCR 715 calls for unconditional acceptance of inspectors and ongoing monitoring/verification | 106 | BW | November 1991 | Decision to dissolve Technical Research Center (TRC): implemented over the following year | 107 | DS | Dec 1991 | Unilateral destruction of remaining 2 missiles completed | 108 | POL | Feb 1992 | Husayn Kamil appointed Supervising Minister, responsible for MIC, Oil, MIM, & head of Economic Committee | 109 | DS | Feb 1992 | UNSCOM-28 prevented from destroying prohibited missile equipment and facilities | 110 | BW | Early 1992 | Iraq begins design, construction of 5 cubic meter fermentors at Hakam (2) and Tuwaitha Agricultural and Biological Research Center (TABRC) (1) | 111 | NUC | March 1992 | PC-3 officially dissolved | 112 | BW | Early 1992 | Al Razi Research Center and Ibn-al-Baytar Center formed | 113 | POL | 17-Mar-92 | Iraq admits to July - Dec â~~91 unilateral destruction of CW, missiles | 114 | DS | Apr 1992 | UNSCOM-34 completes destruction of known prohibited missile production equipment and buildings | 115 | DS | Apr 1992 | Creation of Ibn-al-Haytham missile R&D center | 116 | NUC | Mar-Apr 1992 | PC-3 and EDC personnel transferred en masse to MIC and other companies to support rebuilding of Iraq | 117 | DS | May 1992 | Iraq submits first missile FFCD | 118 | NUC | Apr - June 1992 | Al Athir nuclear weapons fabrication & assembly facility destroyed by IAEA | 119 | BW | 01-May-92 | Iraq admits it had defensive BW program | 120 | CW | June 1992 | Iraq provides FFCD for CW | 121 | CW | July 1992 | UNSCOM begins destruction of CW facilities | 122 | OTHER/NUC | 1993 | MIC initiates Rail Gun Program at the High Voltage Establishment (later renamed Al Tahadi) | 123 | POL | 13-Jan-93 | US, UK, France conduct bombing raids on southern Iraq (targeted missile sites and command and control bases) | 124 | POL | Feb 1993 | Saddam warns strikes on Iraq will result in a precise reaction | 125 | POL | 1993 | Husayn Kamil tells WMD scientists that programs will resume and be expanded once inspectors leave | 126 | DS | 1993 | Al Samud program initiated | 127 | CW | 20-Oct-93 | Former CW facilities split from National Company for Agricultural Chemicals and Medicines | 128 | POL | November 1993 | Iraq accepts UNSCR 715: long-term monitoring | 129 | BW | 1994 | 1993-1995 Bacillus thuringiensis (dry formulated preparation) produced at Al Hakam | 130 | POL | Jan 1994 | National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) established in response to UNSCR 715 | 131 | PROC | Early 1994 | Iraq takes drastic measures (e.g. amputation) to enforce emergency economic measures | 132 | DS | 17-Mar-94 | UNSCOM letter limits diameter of Al Samud to 600mm and restricts use of SA-2 in SSM mode | 133 | CW | 01-Jun-94 | UNSCOM completes destruction of known CW agents and production facilities | 134 | OTHER/NUC | 1994 | Iraqi laser projects moved from IAEC to MIC Laser Research Center | 135 | NUC | Mid 1994 | Iraqi nuclear scientists prohibited from traveling outside Iraq | 136 | POL | Late 1994 | Iraq threatens to stop co-operating unless oil embargo lifted | 137 | POL | Late 1994 | Iraq moves forces to Kuwaiti border | 138 | POL | 13-Oct-94 | Russians counsel Iraq to accept Kuwait border | 139 | POL | 21-Oct-94 | Iraq, Russia offer joint proposal to recognize Kuwait if sanctions lifted | 140 | POL | November 1994 | Iranian missile attack on MEK facilities in Iraq | 141 | BW | Early 1995 | UNSCOM discovers 42 tons of unaccounted-for BW growth medium; Iraq cannot explain | 142 | DS | March 1995 | Iraq blocks destruction of SCUD engine production equipment | 143 | BW | 07-Apr-95 | UNSCOM seminar concludes Iraq has undeclared full scale BW program | 144 | POL | 14-Apr-95 | UN passes Oil for Food (OFF) Resolution 986 | 145 | POL | Early 1995 | Iraq wants deal: â~~Give us a clean report on CW and missiles and we will satisfy UN resolutions on BWâ~® | 146 | POL | 03-May-95 | UNSCOM seminar concludes Iraq has not fully disclosed past CW activities | 147 | DS | June 1995 | SCUD engine production equipment destroyed | 148 | POL | June 1995 | Iraqi Foreign Minister demands UNSC lift sanctions | 149 | OTHER/NUC | Mid 1995 | MIC cancels Rail Gun program at Al Tahadi | 150 | BW | 01-Jul-95 | Iraq admits offensive BW program but denies weaponization | 151 | BW | 01-Jul-95 | Iraq submits draft BW FFCD based on 1 July admission of BW program | 152 | BW | 01-Jul-95 | Russia agrees to provide Iraq with 50 cubic meter fermentation plant | 153 | POL | 17-Jul-95 | Saddam demands UNSC lift sanctions | 154 | BW | 04-Aug-95 | Iraq submits BW FFCD based on 1 July admission | 155 | POL | 08-Aug-95 | Husayn Kamil flees Iraq | 156 | BW | 09-Aug-95 | Iraq declares BW FFCD null and void | 157 | POL | mid-Aug 1995 | Kamal Mustafa orders Walid Tawfiq to burn docs at â~~Aqarquf | 158 | BW | 17-Aug-95 | Iraq declares more complete BW program (still does not declare ricin) | 159 | POL | 20-Aug-95 | Iraq reveals 143 boxes of documents to UNSCOM at chicken farm | 160 | CW | Sep 1995 | Saddam orders creation of the Industrial Committee (IC) and Economic Committee (EC) | 161 | BW | 01-Sep-95 | Iraq admits more of its BW program (now includes ricin) | 162 | POL | Sep-Oct 95 | Large number of organizational changes in MIC | 163 | DS | Nov 1995 | Iraq submits second missile FFCD | 164 | PROC | Late 1995 | Saddam re-establishes the Economic Affairs Committee (EAC) to influence fiscal and monetary policy | 165 | DS | 01-Nov-95 | Iraq begins the Al Bayâ~®ah (L-29) RPV program | 166 | DS | 10-Nov-95 | UNSCOM intercepts illegal Russian SS-N-18 SLBM gyros in Jordan | 167 | DS | Dec 1995 | Dr. Muzhir is imprisoned (until January 1998) | 168 | PROC | | Iraqi economy bottoms out (GDP drops to 20% of 1989; inflation hits 387%) | 169 | PROC | 1996 | Annual MIC budget is $7.8M | 170 | CW | 1996-1997 | Industrial Committee begins work, plans to coordinate indigenous chemical production | 171 | POL | 06-Jan-96 | Saddam decrees austerity measures due to inflation caused by sanctions | 172 | PROC | 17-Jan-96 | Iraq agrees to discuss UN plan for limited oil sales | 173 | POL | 23-Feb-96 | Husayn Kamil and brother are executed following their return to Iraq | 174 | POL | | Iraq signs MOU accepting Oil for Food | 175 | CW | June 1996 | Iraq submits 3rd chemical FFCD | 176 | BW | 15-Jun-96 | After series of draft BW FFCDâ~®s, Iraq submits first post-Husayn Kamil departure BW FFCD | 177 | BW | 20-Jun-96 | Al Hakam BW plant destroyed under UNSCOM supervision | 178 | DS | July 1996 | Iraq submits 3rd missile FFCD | 179 | DS | 1996 | Work commences at Ibn Firnas to convert L-29 to an RPV | 180 | POL | 1996 | WMD scientists ordered to sign agreement to turn over any documentation in their homes | 181 | NUC | 1996 | Fadil Al Janabi appointed head of IAEC | 182 | PROC | 1996 | Regime procurement with Jordan leads to further sanctions erosion | 183 | POL | 31-Aug-96 | Iraqi forces attack Irbil | 184 | CW | Sep 1996 | Twenty fourth meeting of the IC indicates committee was concerned about wasting intellectual capital | 185 | BW | 01-Sep-96 | Iraq submits new BW FFCD | 186 | POL | 03-Sep-96 | Coalition forces extend No-Fly zones | 187 | NUC | 07-Sep-96 | Iraq submits nuclear FFCD | 188 | OTHER/NUC | After 1996 | Air defense projects were a priority at the IAEC | 189 | POL | 10-Dec-96 | OFF is implemented | 190 | POL | 12-Dec-96 | Assassination attempt cripples â~~Uday Husayn | 191 | NUC | Through 1990s | Two scientists - one former EMIS and one former centrifuge - retain hidden nuclear documents and components | 192 | PROC | 18-Mar-97 | Iraq grants Russia MFN trade status, awards it 20% of initial OFF contracts | 193 | PROC | 22-Mar-97 | Iraq establishes a new Iraqi/Russian oil company | 194 | POL | 27-Mar-97 | Huwaysh becomes director of MIC; preserving pre-war nuclear competence becomes less important | 195 | POL | Early 1997 | VP Ramadan recognizes OFF activities as opportunity | 196 | DS | 13-Apr-97 | First flight of L-29 RPV | 197 | POL | 1997 | Huwaysh orders MIC employees to sign statements certifying they do not have WMD documents or equipment | 198 | PROC | 1997 | Regime procurement with Jordan, South Korea, Syria leads to further sanctions erosion | 199 | NUC | 19-Jul-97 | Fireset exhumed from rubble at Al Athir and turned over to inspectors | 200 | POL | Sept 1997 | Iranian aircraft strike MEK facilities in Iraq; Iraq asks UN to act | 201 | BW | Sept 1997 | UN inspectors find documents from July 1995 that show Russia intended to sell Iraq dual-use fermentation equipment | 202 | BW | 01-Sep-97 | Iraq submits new BW FFCD | 203 | CW | Oct 1997 | Chemical process equipment purchased before 1991 for CW programs destroyed by UNSCOM | 204 | POL | 10-Oct-97 | UNSCOM attempts inspection of a Presidential palace and Iraq denies access | 205 | POL | 15-Oct-97 | Iraq protests UN inspection practices | 206 | DS | 24-Oct-97 | First Al Samud launch | 207 | DS | Nov 1997 | UNSCOM Executive Chairman Butler to Iraq Government: no SA2 components to be used on Iraqi ballistic missiles | 208 | PROC | Nov 1997 | Saddam approves MIC plan to use IIS to assist procurement | 209 | POL | 03-Nov-97 | Iraq awards Russian company contract to develop W Qurna oil field | 210 | POL | 13-Nov-97 | UNSCOM suspends inspections in Iraq | 211 | DS | Nov 1997 | L-29 RPV and associated control equipment deployed to Tallil airbase in southern Iraq. | 212 | POL | 20-Nov-97 | Russia brokers agreement to resume UN inspections; inspections subsequently resume | 213 | PROC | Nov 1997 | Aziz travels to Syria to re-establish relations | 214 | PROC | 28-Nov-97 | Rabiâ~®ah and Al Qaâ~®im border crossings opened with Syria (no UN monitoring) | 215 | OTHER/NUC | After 1997 | Large laser research contract between MIC and Technology University initiated | 216 | NUC | By 1998 | Many nuclear scientists have migrated to other high priority programs such as air defense, infrastructure repair, rebuilding industrial base | 217 | CW/DS | Feb 1998 | Technical Evaluation Meetings (TEM) conclude Iraq has not fully disclosed CW, missile activities | 218 | POL | Early 1998 | Inner circle views Saddam as increasingly reclusive | 219 | PROC | 06-Feb-98 | Iraq rejects UNâ~®s proposal to increase oil exports | 220 | PROC | 20-Feb-98 | UNSCR 1153 expands Iraqi oil sales to $5.256B/year | 221 | POL | 23-Feb-98 | Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with UN Secretary General on inspection of Presidential sites | 222 | BW | March/April 1998 | BW Technical Evaluation Meetings conclude Iraq has not fully disclosed BW programs | 223 | CW | Apr 1998 | VX discovered on missile warhead fragments | 224 | POL | 28-Apr-98 | UNSC decides to continue sanctions; reinstates 60 day reviews | 225 | POL | 1998 | Huwaysh becomes Deputy PM/Head of the Ind. Committee: new Husayn Kamil? | 226 | OTHER/NUC | 1998 Onward | Saddam becomes increasingly interested in the activities of the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) & begins holding regular meetings with IAEC representatives | 227 | PROC | 19-Jun-98 | UNSCR 1175 allows $300M for oil spare parts | 228 | POL | 24-Jun-98 | Leak reveals VX lab results; allies condemn Iraq | 229 | POL | 1998 | Iraq disappointed when positive IAEA report does not lead to UN resolution | 230 | CW | Jul 1998 | Mosul University accepts DCC (VX stabilizer) tasking | 231 | BW | July 1998 | BW TEM, held in Baghdad at Iraqâ~®s request, concludes BW not fully disclosed | 232 | PROC | 05-Jul-98 | Iraq and Jordan agree to construct oil pipeline | 233 | PROC | 1998 | French refusal to pay surcharge on Iraqi oil causes relations between the countries to cool | 234 | PROC | 1998 | Regime procurement with Bulgaria, France, FRY, PRC, and South Korea leads to further sanctions erosion | 235 | PROC | 15-Jul-98 | Iraq & Syria agree to build second pipeline | 236 | POL | 18-Jul-98 | UNSCOM discovers Air Force CW document at Air Force HQ | 237 | POL | 03-Aug-98 | Aziz-Butler standoff: â~~Aziz rejects proposed schedule & demands favorable report to UNSC | 238 | POL | 05-Aug-98 | Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) announces end of no-notice UN inspections | 239 | POL | 11-Aug-98 | NMD committee to sort documents is formed | 240 | PROC | 20-Aug-98 | Iraq and Syria agree to re-open pipeline (Kirkuk to Mediterranean Terminals) | 241 | POL | 09-Sep-98 | UNSCR 1194 condemns Iraqâ~®s decision to stop cooperation with UNSCOM | 242 | POL | 27-Sep-98 | Turkey restores full diplomatic relations with Iraq | 243 | POL | 23-Oct-98 | UN Expert Panel confirms VX and stabilizer DCC found in destroyed warheads, asks Iraq to explain | 244 | POL | 31-Oct-98 | UN discontinues UNSCOM Monitoring due to increased tension and Iraqi intransigence | 245 | POL | 14-Nov-98 | Under US military threat Iraq agrees to resume inspections | 246 | PROC | 05-Dec-98 | MIC establishes second front company (ARMOS) to trade with Russia | 247 | POL | Late 1998/Early 1999 | Saddam disappointed at Huwaysh report that only conventional missile payloads available | 248 | POL | 16-Dec-98 | UNSCOM & IAEA leave Iraq, but NMD continues site liaison and data collection | 249 | POL | 17-Dec-98 | Desert Fox | 250 | POL | 19-Dec-98 | Iraq declares that UNSCOM will never be allowed to return | 251 | OTHER/NUC | 1999 | IAEC initiates a rail gun program at two sites: Roland Missile Factory and adjacent to Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) | 252 | DS | Jan 1999 | RPV-20/30 program starts | 253 | PROC | 04-Jan-99 | Iraq & Jordan renew crude oil agreement and renegotiate annually | 254 | PROC | 13-Jan-99 | World oil production cut, Iraq plans to raise output to 3 million barrels per day | 255 | PROC | 07-Feb-99 | King Husayn of Jordan dies, his heir restricts illicit trade with Iraq | 256 | POL | Feb - Apr 1999 | Amorim panel meets, recommends creating new inspection group | 257 | POL | March 1999 | Iraq media calls for strikes on US targets to force change in US policy | 258 | POL | Apr 1999 | France & Russia introduce draft resolution; Netherlands & UK counter | 259 | DS | June 1999 | Huwaysh replaces Raâ~®id with Muzhir at Al Karama | 260 | POL | 01-Jun-99 | Iran fires three missiles at MEK camp in Iraq | 261 | OTHER/NUC | 1999 | Huwaysh gets research grants for university professors to preserve scientific base | 262 | POL | 1999 | Huwaysh orders MIC not to jeopardize lifting of sanctions | 263 | OTHER/NUC | 1999 | IAEC establishes new laser division | 264 | PROC | 1999 | Regime procurement with Bulgaria, France, FRY, India, Jordan, North Korea, Russia, and Ukraine leads to further sanctions erosion | 265 | POL | 1999 | MIC employees sign affidavits pledging to surrender documents and not to import prohibited materials | 266 | OTHER/NUC | 1999 | Saddam personally intervenes to improve IAEC conditions; raises salaries and prevents scientists from leaving | 267 | POL | 1999 | Saddam asks Huwaysh how long it will take to build a CW production line | 268 | POL | 17-Jul-99 | Saddam speech: America has taken control of the oil wealth of Arab countries | 269 | PROC | Oct 1999 | Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) Director Rafiâ~® Daham Al Tikriti dies; replacement is close to MIC | 270 | POL | Dec 1999 | Russians push to lift sanctions | 271 | POL | 17-Dec-99 | UNSCR 1284 creates UN Monitoring and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC) and lifts all Iraqi oil export ceilings | 272 | OTHER/NUC | 2000 | MIC rail gun program research continuing at Al Tahadi | 273 | PROC | 2000 | Sharp rise in Iraqi educational spending: two new universities | 274 | PROC | Jan 2000 | Turkish trade/oil sale protocol signed | 275 | DS | Jan 2000 | Start of Al Quds UAV program with goal of 100kg payload | 276 | CW | Feb 2000 | Yugoimport submits tender to MIC for $53,125 of white phosphorous (WP) | 277 | CW | March 2000 | Fallujah II complex renovates chlorine and phenol lines and restarts | 278 | CW | Mar 2000 | Yugoimport Special Purpose Military Production firm Krusik delivers 11,150 KG of WP to Hatin, which produces WP rounds | 279 | POL | 01-Mar-00 | Blix assumes leadership of UNSCOM successor UNMOVIC | 280 | PROC | May 2000 | Syria-Iraq Trade/Oil sale protocol established; Syrian pipeline opens | 281 | POL | June 2000 | Saddam speech: Iraq cannot give up its weapons if neighbors do not | 282 | DS | June 2000 | Saddam orders the design of long range missile | 283 | POL/PROC | June 2000 | French contracts under OFF total $1.78B--second only to Russia | 284 | PROC | 10-Jun-00 | President Hafez al-Assad of Syria dies: opens diplomatic opportunities for Iraq | 285 | PROC | July 2000 | Iraq negotiates deals with Russia worth $20B | 286 | OTHER/NUC | 2000 | Al Tahadi Company signs magnet production line contract with Romanian company | 287 | PROC | 2000 | Regime procurement with Belarus, FRY, India, Jordan, North Korea, PRC, South Korea, Syria, Russia and Ukraine leads to further sanctions erosion | 288 | DS | 23-Aug-00 | Engineering drawings for 2 and 5 clustered SA-2 engine missiles created | 289 | PROC | Sept 2000 | 10% contract value kickbacks on OFF imports officially begin; may have been occurring since 1998 | 290 | PROC | Mid-Late 2000 | Iraq initiates contacts with a Chinese firm NORINCO, and first of several contacts over the next two years | 291 | POL | 01-Nov-00 | Baghdad International Fair: 46 countries participate, a ten-year record | 292 | POL | 07-Nov-00 | Saudis open border for OFF exports | 293 | PROC | Dec 2000 | Leadership starts $.20-$.35 per barrel OFF oil surcharge; by 2002 drops to $.15 per barrel | 294 | NUC | March 2001 | IAEC President asks Saddam to gather former IAEC scientists and researchers at Tuwaitha - Saddam says no | 295 | POL | April 2001 | Major Iranian missile attack on Mujaheddin el-Khalq (MEK) facilities in Iraq | 296 | DS | Early 2001 | L-29 RPV crash on final attempted unmanned flight | 297 | NUC | 20-May-01 | Iraqi embassy in Nairobi reports rejecting an opportunity to buy uranium | 298 | PROC | June 2001 | Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) begins to get cash/gold from OFF kickbacks via courier | 299 | DS | June 2001 | Huwaysh approves the Al Samud II program | 300 | POL | 2001 | MIC Director orders reconstruction of items destroyed by UNSCOM | 301 | POL | 2001 | Saddam asks Huwaysh if he had developed BW and is told no | 302 | POL | 2001 | Intensified Iraqi intel focus on Iranian nuclear program | 303 | OTHER/NUC | 2001 | Al Tahadi Company signs magnet production line contract with Belarusian company | 304 | PROC | 2001 | Regime procurement with Belarus, Bulgaria, France, FRY, India, Jordan, North Korea, PRC, South Korea, Syria, Russia and Ukraine leads to further sanctions erosion | 305 | POL | 2001 | NMD deputy requests scientists to turn in any documents they may have at home | 306 | OTHER/NUC | 2001 | IAEC establishes Technical Research Branch under Physics Department to support rail gun research | 307 | POL | mid 2001 | Aluminum tubes destined for Iraq captured in Jordan | 308 | DS | 24-Aug-01 | First successful launch of Al Samud II | 309 | PROC | 01-Sep-01 | MIC founds a 3rd front company: Al Mufakhir Export Co | 310 | POL | 11-Sep-01 | 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington | 311 | POL | 12-Sep-01 | Iraq misinterprets US reaction to events of 9/11; adopts ill-conceived diplomatic position | 312 | OTHER/NUC | Late 2001 | IAEC Modernization Project begins and initiates purchase of CNC machines | 313 | POL | Oct-Nov 2001 | Enduring Freedom defeats the Taliban in Afghanistan | 314 | DS | Dec 2001 | Iraq begins serial production of the Al Samud II | 315 | POL | Late 2001 | Around this time, Iraqi scientists tell Regime leaders they cannot produce WMD | 316 | OTHER/NUC | January 2002 | Saddam issues order for IAEC and MIC to implement cooperative projects in physics, machining, electronics | 317 | PROC | January 2002 | Saddam directs the MIC to assist the IAEC with foreign procurement | 318 | PROC | 26-28 January 2002 | Tariq â~~Aziz visits Moscow and Beijing to bolster international support for lifting UNSC sanctions | 319 | POL | 29-Jan-02 | Bush refers to â~~Axis of Evilâ~® in State of the Union address | 320 | NUC | 12-Feb-02 | Saddam declares â~eWe will not return to itâ~~ with reference to nuclear weapons | 321 | POL | 13-Feb-02 | Iraq says inspectors will not be allowed to return | 322 | PROC | March 2002 | MIC front company ARMOS authorized to trade outside of Russia | 323 | POL | 21-Mar-02 | Russia blocks UNSC attempt to tighten-up OFF, reduce violations | 324 | POL | March/April 2002 | Iraq & UN hold new inspection talks in NY | 325 | DS | 01-Jun-02 | Jinin cruise missile project initiated (1000km range; 500kg payload) | 326 | DS | 2002 | Ibn Firnas recommends MIC cancel L-29 RPV program | 327 | POL | July 2002 | Iraq & UN hold more inspection talks in Vienna | 328 | OTHER/NUC | Mid 2002 | MIC Rotating Machinery Department (RMD) formed; machine tools ordered, including a balancing machine | 329 | OTHER/NUC | 05-Jul-02 | Copper vapor laser demonstrated to Huwaysh; put into storage | 330 | PROC | 2002 | Regime procurement with Belarus, France, FRY, India, Jordan, PRC, Russia, Syria and Ukraine leads to further sanctions erosion | 331 | POL/PROC | 2002 | Iraq and Russia negotiate $40B oil development deal to be undertaken once sanctions are lifted | 332 | OTHER/NUC | 2002 | MIC sponsors 3200 research projects in Iraqi universities (up from 40 in 1997) | 333 | OTHER/NUC | 2002 | MIC builds explosive test facility capable of researching shaped charges | 334 | POL | Mid 2002 | Iraq begins production of 81mm aluminum tubes for rockets | 335 | DS | Sept 2002 | CAD designs for a launcher accommodating missiles up to 1m in diameter; 9m in length | 336 | POL | Sept 2002 | Higher Committee, once controlled by Tariq â~~Aziz, is reconstituted to deal with inspections, headed by Taha Ramadan | 337 | CW | Sep 02 | Over 900,000 nerve agent antidote autoinjectors had been purchased | 338 | POL | 12-Sep-02 | Bush calls Iraq â~~Grave and gathering dangerâ~® in UN General Assembly (UNGA) speech | 339 | POL | 16-Sep-02 | Iraq agrees to readmit inspectors | 340 | POL | 18-Sep-02 | Publication of UK Iraq WMD dossier | 341 | POL | Nov 2002 | MIC scientists meet and are told that Iraq has no WMD, and they must not hide anything from inspectors | 342 | DS | Nov 2002 | Jinin and other covert delivery system programs suspended due to return of inspectors | 343 | POL | 08-Nov-02 | UNSCR 1441 finds Iraq in material breach, calls for disarmament and FFCD | 344 | POL | 08-Nov-02 | Russia refuses to veto UNSCR 1441 | 345 | POL | 27-Nov-02 | UNMOVIC inspections begin | 346 | POL | Dec 2002 | Saddam tells his Generals he does not have WMD | 347 | POL | Dec 2002 | Saddam tells military leaders/senior leaders to â~ecooperate completelyâ~~ with inspectors | 348 | POL/DS | Dec 2002 | UNMOVIC freezes the Al Samud II and Al Fatâ~®h flight tests upon further analysis of systemâ~®s range capbility | 349 | OTHER/NUC | Dec 2002 | Details of IAEC dual-use CNC machine purchases provided to UN/IAEA | 350 | POL | End of 2002 | Iraq successfully flight tests 81mm rockets with indigenously produced aluminum tubes | 351 | POL | Late 2002 | Iraq again attempts foreign purchase of 81mm tubes | 352 | POL | Dec 2002 | NMD publishes the Currently Accurate Full, and Complete Declaration | 353 | CW | Jan 2003 | Two teams from IAEC and Al Majid Company develop multipurpose controllers for process plant | 354 | PROC | Jan 2003 | MIC annual budget at $500M | 355 | POL | Jan-2003 | UNMOVIC finds 12 empty 122mm CW rocket warheads | 356 | POL | Jan 2003 | Iraqi MoD conference on Iranian WMD | 357 | POL | 20-Jan-03 | Husam Amin tells military leaders to cooperate with inspectors, repeating Saddamâ~®s earlier directives | 358 | POL | 20-Jan-03 | The MIC directs all Directors General of state companies to relinquish any WMD to the NMD | 359 | POL | 25-Jan-03 | The NMD director meets with Republican Guard (RG) leaders and advises they sign documents stating no WMD in RG units | 360 | CW | Feb 2003 | Inspection of Al Nuâ~®man factory reveals cluster bomb that management claimed from Al Muthanna | 361 | POL | Feb 2003 | According to senior Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saddam has decided to use CW against US troops in the event of war | 362 | CW | Feb-2003 | Iraq recommends excavating R-400 bomb fragments at Al â~~Aziziyah | 363 | NUC | February 2003 | DG of NMD still trying to satisfy IAEA concern over missing explosive lens mold drawings | 364 | POL | 05-Feb-03 | US SecState Powell presents evidence of Iraqi WMD programs to UNSC | 365 | POL | 14-Feb-03 | Saddam issues directive banning private companies and individuals from importing WMD materials or producing WMD | 366 | POL | 28-Feb-03 | Russia threatens veto of UNSCR authorizing war on Iraq | 367 | CW | March 2003 | New construction scheduled for MIM plant to provide indigenous multi-purpose production facility, halted due to OIF | 368 | PROC | Mar 2003 | MIC has $186M in contracts with Syria (SES Company) | 369 | DS | 1-17 Mar 2003 | UNMOVIC bans Samud II and supervises destruction of missiles | 370 | PROC | Early 2003 | Regime procurement with Belarus, Bulgaria, France, India, Jordan, PRC, Russia, Syria, and Ukraine leads to further sanctions erosion | 371 | PROC | 01-Mar-03 | MIC has accumulated $300M+ in reserves | 372 | PROC | Early March | Saddam forms a funds distribution committee consisting of Minister of Finance, President of the Diwan, Presidential Secretary, and Qusay Husayn | 373 | POL | 06-Mar-03 | UNMOVIC publishes report - Unresolved Disarmament Issues (Clusters) | 374 | POL | 10-Mar-03 | France threatens veto of UN resolution authorizing war; later opposes OIF | 375 | POL | 18-Mar-03 | UNMOVIC and IAEA depart Iraq | 376 | POL | 19-Mar-03 | Initiation of hostilities | 377 | POL | Late March 2003 | Saddam implies to military leaders that he has secret weapon |
> Posted: Apr 22, 2007 05:38 PM> Last Updated: Apr 22, 2007 05:38 PM> Last Reviewed: Apr 22, 2007 05:38 PM> > | |
Source: https://www.cia.gov
